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Wilhelm Halbfass, in his landmark study India and Europe (1988), 
explores the history of intellectual encounters between India and Europe 
from classical antiquity to the twentieth century. He concludes his study 
with a discussion of the “global predicament of Westernization” in the 
contemporary period, reflecting more specifically on the problems that 
the so-called “Europeanization of the earth” presents for both European 
and Indian partners in the “dialogue.” 
 
Will the “Europeanization” of the earth be reversed? Are other cultures 
and traditions…ready to provide alternatives? In the modern planetary 
situation, Eastern and Western “cultures”…meet in a Westernized 
world, under conditions shaped by Western ways of thinking. The 
medium, the framework of any “dialogue” seems to be an irreducibly 
Western one. But is this factually inescapable “universality” the true 
telos of mankind? Could it be that the global openness of modernity is 
still a parochially Western, European horizon (440)?1  
 
Halbfass’s question concerning the European—and more broadly, 
European-American—presumption that history’s direction is towards a 
modern, open, universal, and essentially “Western” global culture has 
been thrown into sharp relief by the events since 9/11 on the world’s 
stage here and abroad. At a minimum, we can certainly say that all the 
players in this global drama of cultural and ideological conflict do not 
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share the same perspective on this important question. In this essay I will 
explore the critical necessity of going beyond the “parochially Western, 
European horizon” of the “dialogue” among the world’s cultures and 
undertaking an alternative form of cross-cultural encounter in which 
Europe is not the privileged partner. Indeed, what if we were to remove 
Europe as a principal partner in the encounter and to investigate instead 
India’s connections with other cultures whose distinctive histories have 
unfolded outside of, inside of, and in spite of the West? What if we were 
to shift the focus of our comparative studies in the academy from “India 
and Europe” to “South Asia and the Middle East” and to explore the 
ongoing economic, political, social, cultural, and religious connections 
that linked these two regions long before the “Europeanization of the 
earth”? I would suggest that this type of comparative enterprise can serve 
as an important antidote to the epistemological hegemony of “Europe-
anization”—and its more recent counterpart, “Americanization”—by 
providing a multiplicity of different imaginaries that do not privilege 
“Western” idioms associated with the modernist project but are rather 
grounded in the indigenous idioms of the cultures of South Asia and the 
Middle East. 
My own work as a comparative historian of religions has emphasized 
the role of comparative study as an inextricable component of the 
scholarly enterprise and as a method of critical interrogation that can 
serve as a means to dismantle the tyranny of prevailing paradigms and to 
explore a range of alternative epistemologies. I have been concerned in 
particular with two functions of comparative analysis: first, as a heuristic 
tool through which we construct and apply our scholarly categories and 
models; and, second, as a critical method through which we continue to 
test, reassess, refine, deconstruct, and reconstitute these categories and 
models (see Holdrege 2000).2 
In the academic study of religion, as in other disciplines, we use a 
variety of categories to select, analyze, classify, and interpret phenomena. 
Analytical categories such as symbol, myth, ritual, scripture, law, ethics, 
and mysticism have historically assumed a central role in the discourse 
of religious studies. Comparative analysis is intrinsic to the process 
through which we construct and apply such categories. We use categories 
as instruments of inclusion and exclusion by means of which we classify 
religious phenomena according to whether they share or do not share 
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certain properties. For example, we construct and define the category 
“scripture” and then we survey and compare a range of potential 
candidates—the Hebrew Bible, the Vedic Sa7hitås, the Qurån, the I 
Ching, and so on—to determine in each case whether the indigenous 
categories accord with our scholarly constructions of the category 
“scripture.”  
The process of comparison involved in the formation and application 
of categories is inherently evaluative and hierarchical in that it establishes 
a standard against which particular phenomena are judged for inclusion 
or exclusion and are ranked as marked or unmarked taxa. The “politics of 
comparison” has been emphasized by Paul Morris (1992): 
 
[The process of comparison] compares two or more things against the 
standard of one thing, producing a hierarchical scale.…First, one 
cannot compare two or more things without first constructing a heuris-
tic scale or scales, consisting of one or more comparators, that allows 
one to identify the two things as comparable in terms of some given 
category. Secondly, the choice of scale is a “political” decision in that 
the given comparator is inherently evaluative. 
  
The politics of comparison in religious studies and other disciplines in 
the human sciences extends beyond the construction of particular catego-
ries to the development of encompassing taxonomies, or classificatory 
systems, constituted by these categories and their interrelations. These 
classificatory schemas at times serve as models in the discourses of 
various disciplines. These models are themselves inherently hierarchical, 
establishing evaluative scales according to which their constitutive 
categories are positioned and ranked in relation to one another. The 
hierarchy of taxonomies becomes the “tyranny of taxonomies”3 when 
certain models are accorded a privileged status as governing paradigms, 
while competing theories and models are marginalized.  
In the following analysis I will explore how this tyranny of taxonomies 
is exemplified in two related sets of paradigms that have assumed the 
status of dominant discourses in the human sciences in Europe and North 
America since the nineteenth century as part of the process of the “Euro-
peanization of the earth”: the Eurocentric paradigms that have dominated 
scholarship in the social sciences and humanities, including history, 
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anthropology, sociology, political science, economics, geography, 
psychology, philosophy, religious studies, and literary studies; and the 
Protestant Christian paradigms that have dominated scholarship in 
religious studies more specifically. One of the important tasks of 
comparative study in this context is to challenge scholars to become 
critically self-conscious of the legacy of these dominant paradigms that 
lingers in our categories and taxonomies and to reconfigure our scholarly 
discourses to include a multiplicity of epistemic perspectives. In the first 
section of my analysis, I will argue that comparative studies of South 
Asia and the Middle East can provide the basis for developing alternative 
epistemologies to the Eurocentric paradigms that have dominated 
scholarship in the human sciences. In the second section, I will suggest 
that comparative studies of Hindu and Jewish traditions—religious 
traditions rooted in South Asia and the Middle East, respectively—can 
provide the basis for developing alternative epistemologies to the 
Protestant-based paradigms that have dominated the academic study of 
religion.  
 
South Asia and the Middle East: Beyond European Hegemony 
 
Eurocentrism has its counterpart in orientalism and Christian mission-
izing projects, in which “Europe” or “the West” provides the implicit 
standard against which the “Rest of the World” and the “Rest of the 
Religions” are compared and evaluated. Thus, Western studies of South 
Asia and the Middle East have generally been undertaken, explicitly or 
implicitly, within a comparative framework in which European concep-
tual categories provide the standard of comparison. This “European 
epistemological hegemony”4 has served to legitimate and perpetuate 
colonial and neo-colonial projects. Long after the period of decoloniza-
tion, the “post-colonial predicament” of scholars in the human sciences 
has involved coming to terms with the legacy of this hegemonic discourse, 
which still prevails as an “internal Eurocentrism” and “internal orien-
talism” that operate—albeit unconsciously—in the representational 
strategies, categories, and practices of many scholars (see Breckenridge 
and van der Veer 1993). Following the seminal critiques of Eurocentric 
ideology in Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) and Samir Amin’s 
Eurocentrism (1989), scholarship in the areas of world economic and 
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social history and world-system analysis has challenged the dominant 
discourse of Eurocentrism on two fronts: first, through sustained critiques 
of prevailing social, economic, and geographic theories and the Euro-
centric historiographies on which they are based; and, second, through 
extended analyses of the contributions of the “Rest of the World”—and 
in particular Asia and the Middle East—to the world-system before, 
during, and after the “European hegemony” that characterizes the modern 
period.5 
J. M. Blaut’s work is representative of the first trend of scholarship.6 In 
his The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and 
Eurocentric History (1993), he argues that Eurocentrism—and more 
specifically the world model of European diffusionism founded on the 
theory of “the European miracle”7—provided the “colonizer’s model     
of the world” that served to explain, legitimate, and promote colonial  
and neo-colonial projects. Despite the emergence of post-colonial studies 
and other forms of ideological criticism that have challenged Eurocentric 
and orientalist ideologies from various disciplinary perspectives, Blaut 
maintains that the pervasive and enduring legacy of Eurocentrism still 
persists in the academy in the form of unconsciously perpetuated axio-
matic propositions that are ascribed the status of “facts.” 
 
There is…a problem with the word “Eurocentrism.” In most discourse 
it is thought of as a sort of prejudice, an “attitude,” and therefore 
something that can be eliminated from enlightened thought.…But the 
really crucial part of Eurocentrism is not a matter of attitudes in the 
sense of values and prejudices, but rather a matter of science, and 
scholarship, and informed and expert opinion. To be precise, Euro-
centrism includes a set of beliefs that are statements about empirical 
reality, statements educated and usually unprejudiced Europeans 
accept as true, as propositions supported by “the facts.”…If they 
[historians] assert that Europeans invented democracy, science, 
feudalism, capitalism, the modern nation-state, and so on, they make 
these assertions because they think that all of this is fact.…How is it 
that Eurocentric historical statements which are not valid—that is, not 
confirmed by evidence and sometimes contradicted by evidence—are 
able to gain acceptance in European historical thought, and thereafter 
survive as accepted beliefs, hardly questioned, for generations and 
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even centuries? This is a crucial problem for historiography and the 
history of ideas (9).8  
 
The world model of European diffusionism, according to Blaut,     
posits that the world has an “Inside” and an “Outside,” a permanent 
center and a permanent periphery, and that significant cultural 
innovations have generally originated in the center—“Greater Europe,” 
including the continent of Europe and countries of European settlement 
overseas—and have flowed from the center via diffusion to the 
periphery—“non-Europe,” including Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
This Eurocentric paradigm, as characterized by Blaut in both its classical 
and modern formulations, posits a series of hierarchical dichotomies 
between socio-cultural categories that distinguish “Europe” from “non-
















Blaut provides an extensive critique of scholarly theories of the auton-
omous “rise of the West”10—or the myth of “the European miracle”—
that have sustained European epistemological hegemony in the academy. 
He defines this myth as “the argument that Europe forged ahead of all 
other civilizations far back in history—in prehistoric or ancient or 
medieval times—and that this internally generated historical superiority 
or priority explains world history and geography after 1492: the moderni-
zation of Europe, the rise of capitalism, the conquest of the world” (50). 
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Blaut systematically examines and refutes the various types of arguments 
that have been used to support the theory of “the European miracle,” 
including biological arguments concerning the racial superiority and 
demographic uniqueness of the Europeans; environmental arguments 
concerning the superior qualities of Europe’s temperate environment 
over the tropical conditions of Africa and the arid conditions of Asia; and 
cultural arguments concerning the superior nature of European ration-
ality, technology, and social structures (59–135).  
While the major portion of Blaut’s study is devoted to critiquing theories 
that support the myth of European exceptionalism, in the second phase  
of his study he provides a brief comparative historical analysis of the 
medieval landscapes of Europe, Asia, and Africa in order to show that 
Europe was not more advanced or more progressive than other civiliza-
tions prior to 1492. Rather, protocapitalist centers were developing in all 
three continents and formed a single commercial network that inter-
connected Western Europe, the Mediterranean, East Africa, the Middle 
East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia (152–78). Europe’s only 
advantage was its geographic location, which after 1492 allowed the 
Europeans to take the lead because of the wealth and power they accrued 
through colonial accumulation in America and later in Asia and Africa 
(179–213). Blaut concludes: 
 
There was no “European miracle.” Africa, Asia, and Europe shared 
equally in the rise of capitalism prior to 1492. After that date, Europe 
took the lead. This happened…because of Europe’s location near 
America and because of the immense wealth obtained by Europeans in 
America and later in Asia and Africa—not because Europeans were 
brighter or bolder or better than non-Europeans, or more modern, more 
advanced, more progressive, more rational. These are myths of Euro-
centric diffusionism and are best forgotten (206). 
 
Although Blaut’s methodology and analytical categories are problem-
atic in certain ways,11 his work is nevertheless representative of an 
important trend of scholarship that attempts to debunk the myth of 
European exceptionalism from the perspective of world history and 
world-system analysis by demonstrating that prior to the modern period 
Europe enjoyed no special advantage but, on the contrary, played a 
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peripheral role in a world-system that was dominated by Asia and the 
Middle East. Advocates of such an approach generally take as their 
starting-point a critique of Immanual Wallerstein’s The Modern World-
System (1974–89). Wallerstein’s Eurocentric theory of the “modern 
world-system” argues that after 1450 a world economy emerged that was 
centered in Europe, which constituted the “core” from which the system 
expanded to incorporate the “Rest of the World” as “semi-periphery” or 
“periphery.” Wallerstein’s theory has been challenged from a variety of 
perspectives, particularly with respect to, first, his treatment of the 
modern world-system as the first and only world-system; second, his 
over-privileging of the role of Europe in the development of the modern 
world economy; and, third, his corresponding neglect of the role of Asia 
and the Middle East in the formation of the modern world-system.  
Janet Abu-Lughod, in Before European Hegemony: The World System 
A.D. 1250–1350 (1989), provides an important corrective to Wallerstein’s 
theory by demonstrating that the modern world-system has a precursor in 
an earlier thirteenth-century world-system. In contrast to Wallerstein’s 
characterization of the modern world-system as organized hierarchically 
around a single center, Abu-Lughod maintains that the thirteenth-century 
world-system was organized on fundamentally different principles and 
consisted of multiple centers that were integrated in a single economic 
system (364–65). She provides an extended comparative historical 
analysis of the eight interconnected subsystems that linked Europe, the 
Middle East, and Asia in a single network of coexisting core powers.12 
Contrary to the myth of European exceptionalism, Abu-Lughod argues 
that in this world-system Europe was “an upstart peripheral to an 
ongoing operation” and that the “rise of the West” cannot be explained 
with reference to “the special technological, cultural, psychological, or 
even economic characteristics of European society” (12, 353).  
 
In terms of time, the century between A.D. 1250 and 1350 constituted 
a fulcrum or critical “turning point” in world history, and in terms of 
space, the Middle East heartland region, linking the eastern Mediterra-
nean with the Indian Ocean, constituted a geographic fulcrum on which 
West and East were then roughly balanced. The thesis of this book is 
that there was no inherent historical necessity that shifted the system to 
favor the West rather than the East, nor was there any inherent historical 
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necessity that would have prevented cultures in the eastern region from 
becoming the progenitors of a modern world system (12).  
 
Abu-Lughod maintains that the “rise of the West” in the sixteenth 
century can best be explained in terms of a number of important systemic 
changes in the fourteenth century—geographic, political, and demo-
graphic—that disrupted the world-system and precipitated the “fall of the 
East,” which left a vacuum of power that was subsequently filled by a 
succession of previously unimportant European players—the Portuguese, 
the Spanish, the Dutch, and the British (18–20, 359–64). 
Marshall Hodgson, in his posthumously published collection of essays 
Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History 
(1993), similarly argues against privileging Eurocentric paradigms of 
world history and world geography and seeks to situate the “rise of the 
West” in the broader context of a multinodal “Afro-Eurasian” network 
comprising four core regions: Europe, the Middle East, India, and China. 
Surveying the “interregional configuration of historical relationships” in 
this Afro-Eurasian network since the second millennium B.C.E., he notes 
that Western Europe played a peripheral role as a frontier region until   
the end of the Middle Ages and that—far from being a pivotal cultural 
innovator—Western Europe was the beneficiary of a one-sided flow of 
cultural exchange that proceeded from East to West: from China, India, 
the Middle East, and the eastern Mediterranean to Western Europe (19–
28). It was this flow of cultural innovations from the broader Afro-
Eurasian network that provided the basis for “the great Western Trans-
mutation” in the period between 1600 and 1800.  
 
The great modern cultural Transmutation presupposed numerous 
inventions and discoveries originating in all the several citied peoples 
of the Eastern Hemisphere,…not…in Europe. In particular, most of the 
more immediately formative elements that led to the Transmutation, 
both material and moral, had come to the Occident, earlier or later, 
from other regions.…At least as important was the very existence of 
the vast world market, constituted by the Afro-Eurasian commercial 
network, which had cumulatively come into being, largely under 
Muslim auspices, by the middle of the second millennium.…Without 
the cumulative history of the whole Afro-Eurasian Oikoumene, of 
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which the Occident had been an integral part, the Western Transmu-
tation would be almost unthinkable (67–68). 
 
Among recent critics of Eurocentrism from the perspective of world-
system analysis, Andre Gunder Frank is one of the most vigorous 
exponents of the need to “reOrient” and reassess the contributions of the 
“Rest of the World” to the shared histories of humankind before, during, 
and after European hegemony. While applauding the efforts of Amin, 
Blaut, Abu-Lughod, Hodgson, and other critics of European exception-
alism, Frank argues that none of these critiques is sufficient to uproot   
the epistemological legacy of Eurocentric ideology. In his ReOrient: 
Global Economy in the Asian Age (1998), he challenges in particular the 
prevailing assumption—held by many historians and social theorists of 
Europe as well as world-system theorists—that there was a fundamental 
discontinuity in world history, generally dated around 1500, that distin-
guishes the medieval period from the modern period, in which the world 
was radically transformed by the “rise of the West” and the development 
of capitalism (see especially 328–29, 342–44). In this context he refutes 
Abu-Lughod’s contention that the thirteenth-century world-system was a 
different world-system, organized on fundamentally different principles, 
from the modern world-system described by Wallerstein as emerging in 
1450. He argues that the modern world-system is rather a continuation  
of Abu-Lughod’s thirteenth-century system and, moreover, that this 
thirteenth-century world-system is a continuation of a much older system 
(xix, xxi–xxii).13 
Frank provides a global comparative analysis of early modern world 
economic history between 1400 and 1800 in which he attempts to show 
that, contrary to Wallerstein’s portrayal of a European-centered modern 
world-system, during this period the world-system did not have a single 
center but rather was characterized by multiple centers, in which China, 
India, and West Asia, or the Middle East, assumed pivotal roles. 
Moreover, while the “rise of the West” is generally dated prior to 1800 
by theorists such as Blaut (after 1492), Abu-Lughod (sixteenth century), 
and Hodgson (between 1600 and 1800), Frank argues that Europe did not 
assume a dominant position in the world economy until after 1800.  
 
The very search for “hegemony” in the early modern world economy 
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or system is misplaced. Europe was certainly not central to the world 
economy before 1800. Europe was not hegemonic structurally, nor 
functionally, nor in terms of economic weight, or of production, 
technology or productivity, nor in per capita consumption, nor in any 
way in its development of allegedly more “advanced” “capitalist” 
institutions. In no way were sixteenth-century Portugal, the seven-
teenth-century Netherlands, or eighteenth-century Britain “hegemonic” 
in world economic terms. Nor in political terms.…In all these respects, 
the economies of Asia were far more “advanced,” and its Chinese 
Ming/Qing, Indian Mughal, and even Persian Safavid and Turkish 
Ottoman empires carried much greater political and even military 
weight than any or all of Europe (5).  
 
Frank argues further that the rise of Europe to a dominant position in 
the world economy after 1800 cannot be explained with reference to 
“any kind of European ‘exceptionalism’ of rationality, institutions, 
entrepeneurship, technology, geniality, in a word—of race” (4) but rather 
must be understood in conjunction with the “decline of the East” in the 
late eighteenth century. Building on Blaut’s thesis, he maintains that the 
European states used silver and gold extracted from the American colonies 
to buy their way into a flourishing Asian market and then, having “bought 
themselves a seat, and then even a whole railway car, on the Asian train” 
(277), they took advantage of the subsequent decline of the economies of 
India, West Asia, and China and built a new “hegemonic” order centered 
in Europe (258–320).  
Frank calls for a radical re-visioning of the dominant social and eco-
nomic theories, models, and categories that have served to perpetuate the 
legacy of Eurocentrism in the academy, including theories of European 
exceptionalism and corresponding models of the “rise of the West,” 
theories of a distinctive “Asiatic mode of production,” constructions of 
“capitalism” and “feudalism,” and notions of European “hegemony” 
(321–39). “The only solution,” he suggests, “is to cut the Gordian knot 
altogether and divest ourselves of all these useless Eurocentric catego-
ries, which only lead to arcane debates and blind us to the real historical 
process.…They were all derived only from European/Western ethnocen-
trism, which was propagated around the world—West and East, North 
and South—as part and parcel of Western colonialism and cultural impe-
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rialism” (336). As an alternative to Eurocentric paradigms, Frank 
emphasizes the need for social theories that are based on a “globally 
holistic world systemic perspective” (341). In contrast to area studies, 
which tend to foster parochialism by focusing on one region of the world 
to the exclusion of others, such a global approach is concerned with 
understanding how each of the world’s cultures—in the Americas, Europe, 
Africa, Asia, and Australasia—is shaped by the dynamic network of 
economic, political, social, and cultural exchanges that constitutes the 
world-system (see especially 340–41, 344).  
While Blaut, Abu-Lughod, Hodgson, and Frank may diverge in their 
explanations of when and why the “rise of the West” occurred, their 
scholarly projects converge in challenging the dominant discourses and 
the myth of European exceptionalism that sustains them. This review of 
their scholarship brings us back to a consideration of the role of compara-
tive analysis as an inextricable component of our scholarly methods. I 
would like to examine briefly three aspects of the role of comparison  
that are brought to light by these critiques of European epistemological 
hegemony. 
First, the politics of comparison is evident in the mechanisms through 
which Eurocentric paradigms—along with the missionizing and raciali-
zation projects they have fostered—have persisted in the academy and 
served as instruments of inclusion and exclusion. These paradigms have 
perpetuated hierarchical taxonomies that privilege certain categories—
such as rationality, modernity, progress, capitalism, freedom, and 
individualism—that together constitute the ideal type “European.” Such 
taxonomies provide an explicit or implicit comparative framework 
against which the “non-European” Other is judged and excluded by a 
series of absences—as non-rational, non-modern, non-progressive, non-
capitalist, and so on. European social, cultural, political, economic, and 
geographic categories are deemed to be paradigmatic and thus provide 
the implicit standard against which the non-conforming categories or 
features of other cultures are evaluated in terms of an absence and judged 
as aberrant, exotic, or deficient by virtue of their non-compliance with 
the standard. 
Second, comparative analysis can serve as a critical method to dismantle 
the tyranny of Eurocentric taxonomies, as illustrated by the studies of 
Blaut, Abu-Lughod, Hodgson, and Frank. Through comparative historical 
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analyses of the economic, political, and socio-cultural institutions of 
Europe and the “Rest of the World” at various points in history, these 
scholars have shown that prior to the modern period—whether dated 
from 1500 or 1800—Europe was not exceptional at all but, on the 
contrary, played a peripheral role in a world-system that was dominated 
by Asia and the Middle East. In this context comparative analysis serves 
as a method of critical interrogation that challenges scholars to reassess 
and re-vision the prevailing categories, models, and theories that have 
fostered the myth of European exceptionalism in the academy. The 
hierarchical model of a world-system with a single center is de-centered 
and displaced by an alternative model: a world-system constituted by a 
synergistic multinodal network of economic, social, and cultural 
exchanges.  
Third, the role of comparative analysis as a method of critical interro-
gation includes not only deconstructing the prevailing paradigms but also 
constructing a multiplicity of alternative imaginaries. This type of analy-
sis involves an epistemic shift from a focus on white-male-European-
Protestant-Christian dominants as the default cultural template to an 
exploration of the systems of knowledge, forms of expressivity, and 
cultural practices of peoples and cultures that have been relegated to the 
margins by the dominant discourses. The post-colonial theorist Walter 
Mignolo has suggested that we need to explore the possibilities of new 
forms of knowledge, which he calls “border thinking,” and “to ‘think 
otherwise,’ from the interior exteriority of the border…[in order] to move 
beyond the categories created and imposed by Western epistemology.” 
“The political and the ethical are at this point in need of a new epistemol-
ogy, epistemologies that come from the borders and from the perspec-
tive of subaltern coloniality.”14 
One possible approach to generating new epistemologies, suggested by 
the work of Frank and other world-system theorists as well as global 
studies advocates, is to adopt a global perspective and to develop new 
categories and models through a comparative macrohistory of the contri-
butions of the key players in the world-system in various historical 
periods. A global studies approach provides an attractive alternative to 
the traditional area studies approach, with its orientalist legacy and 
historical roots in cold war strategic concerns. However, most of the 
critics of Eurocentrism and orientalism who have adopted a world-
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system perspective have ironically still tended to allot Europe a 
privileged role in their studies by giving undue attention to it as the 
hegemonic upstart whose claims to exceptionalism must be subverted 
through comparison with other cultures’ contributions to the world-
system.  
In my own work I have pursued an approach that can serve to mediate 
between a global studies approach and the traditional area studies 
approach. This approach, rather than attempting to compare the contribu-
tions of all the nodes in the multinodal world-system, entails a more 
circumscribed comparative study focused on two of the nodes, two of  
the key players, in the world-system before, during, and after European 
hegemony: South Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, rather than 
viewing South Asia and the Middle East from the perspective of these 
regions’ pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial encounters with Europe, 
this comparative approach removes the European optic and gives priority 
instead to studying the historical connections and structural affinities 
between the cultures of South Asia and the Middle East directly, without 
privileging Europe as an explicit or implicit partner in the comparison.  
Comparative studies of the cultures of South Asia and the Middle 
East—including a consideration of economic, political, social, cultural, 
and religious connections—contribute to our scholarly discourse in the 
human sciences by generating a rich array of new categories and models 
that are grounded in the distinctive idioms of cultures that shared 
complexly interwoven histories long before the “rise of the West.” 
Recent initiatives in this area include the Middle East and South Asia 
Comparative Studies Project at the University of California, Santa 
Barbara, inaugurated in 2001, and the forthcoming Encyclopedia of the 
Middle East and South Asia, edited by Gordon Newby. My colleague 
Dwight Reynolds remarks concerning the significance of such compara-
tive studies: 
 
Western scholarship on the Middle East and South Asia has been 
dominated almost entirely by discussions of the bilateral relationship of 
each of these regions to the West while ignoring questions about their 
relationship to each other.…The emergence of critical schools of 
thought such as subaltern studies, postcolonial studies, and the overall 
critique of orientalism, have all attempted to rectify this dominant 
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view, but even these schools of thought have generally restricted their 
focus to critiquing the “vertical” or “center-periphery” relationship 
between colonized and colonizers. They have for the most part ignored 
the potential for radically resituating that discourse through scrutiny   
of the “lateral” relationships that obtain among regions of the globe 
without triangulating that inquiry through Europe.…There is a complex 
web of multifaceted historical connections linking these two regions 
[the Middle East and South Asia] that remains virtually ignored in 
western scholarship due to the overriding interest in studying how each 
of these regions has interacted with the West. To study the Middle East 
and South Asia without constant reference to the West is thus not only 
to study these regions from a perspective much closer to their own 
historical worldview, but also to explore territory almost untouched by 
western scholarship (Reynolds 2001). 
 
Abu-Lughod, as the keynote speaker at the inaugural symposium of the 
UCSB Middle East and South Asia project in March 2001, emphasized 
the need for sustained comparative studies of the long-standing economic, 
socio-cultural, and religious connections between the Middle East and 
South Asia. While recognizing the potential contributions of such com-
parative studies in “de-center[ing] both traditional area studies and the 
ostensibly new field of globalization studies,” she also emphasized the 
importance of undertaking such studies within the broader context of 
world-system analysis in order to understand how the relations between 
the Middle East and South Asia have been affected by the changing 
dynamics of the world-system in different historical periods.  
 
The persistent connections between the Middle East and Asia cannot 
be overemphasized. Anyone with a deeper historical perspective would 
take these connections as an assumed “fact,” since the existence of 
mini-world-systems, prior to the achievement of “western” dominance 
over both regions during the colonial period, is hardly a problematic to 
be explained.…History is written by the victor, [and therefore] for too 
long not only the world, but the description of it has been shaped by 
the dominant. This has led not only to distortions, but to a sad neglect 
of the study of ongoing connections between the Middle East and 
Asia.…[But] a myopic focus on even this vastly extended “area studies” 
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model would be inadequate.…Regional area studies and processes of 
globalization are not mutually exclusive enterprises. At various points 
in time, the intra-regional relations [between the Middle East and Asia] 
have been affected by the larger (and changing) characteristics of 
global forces. A truly exemplary program will want to address how 
Middle Eastern-Asian connections have been shaped and transformed 
by globalization, early, late, and present (Abu-Lughod 2001). 
 
Hinduisms and Judaisms: Beyond Protestant Christian Hegemony 
 
My own work as a comparative historian of religions has focused on an 
exploration of the affinities between two religious traditions that are 
rooted in South Asia and the Middle East: Hinduisms and Judaisms. The 
differences between Hindu and Jewish traditions have often been empha-
sized, so much so that these traditions have generally been characterized 
as representing opposite ends of the spectrum of the world’s religions. 
However, in recent years such characterizations have been challenged 
from a variety of perspectives, and there has been an upsurge of interest 
in the comparative study of Hindu and Jewish traditions among scholars 
of religion. The 1994 collection of essays edited by Hananya Goodman, 
Between Jerusalem and Benares: Comparative Studies in Judaism and 
Hinduism, represents one of the first serious efforts by a group of scholars 
of Judaica and South Asia to explore the historical connections and 
cross-cultural resonances between these traditions.15 A number of forums 
have been established to foster comparative studies of Hindu and Jewish 
traditions and, more broadly, of Indic and Jewish cultures: the Society for 
Indo-Judaic Studies (1993); the Journal of Indo-Judaic Studies (1994); the 
American Academy of Religion Comparative Studies in Hinduisms and 
Judaisms Consultation (1995); and the American Academy of Religion 
Comparative Studies in Hinduisms and Judaisms Group (1998). More 
recently, an international conference convened at Oxford University 
inspired the volume of essays Indo-Judaic Studies in the Twenty-First 
Century (Katz et al. 2007).16 The volume advances the emerging field of 
“Indo-Judaic studies” in significant ways by providing the first sustained 
multidisciplinary investigation of the social, political, economic, cultural, 
and religious connections between Indic and Jewish cultures from ancient 
to contemporary times. 
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What does an exploration of the intersections of Indic and Judaic 
cultures contribute to the broader scholarly enterprise of religious studies 
and the human sciences more generally? I would argue that such com-
parative inquiries—and more specifically, comparative studies of Hindu 
and Jewish traditions undertaken within a religious studies framework—
can play an important role in dismantling European epistemological 
hegemony by providing alternative epistemologies to the Protestant-
based paradigms that have served to perpetuate the ideals of Enlighten-
ment discourse and colonialist projects.  
These paradigms originated from a predominantly Protestant Christian 
academic elite in the European academy in the nineteenth century. The 
continuing epistemological and institutional hegemony of Christian 
traditions in the academic study of religion in Europe and North America 
is clearly discernible in the structure of the American Academy of 
Religion (AAR). As of April 2010, out of the seventy-seven AAR 
Program Units that were devoted to the study of particular religious 
traditions, thirty-three, or forty-three percent, were allotted to the study 
of Christian traditions. Moreover, sixteen of these Program Units were 
focused primarily on some aspect of Christian theology, while there were 
only two Program Units that included consideration of the theology of 
non-Christian traditions. Furthermore, only two Program Units were 
devoted exclusively to Hindu traditions and one to Jewish traditions, 
along with three additional Program Units that included one or both of 
these traditions in their purview.17 The institutional structure of the AAR 
thus accords a privileged status to Christian traditions, not only as the 
object of historical studies but also as the focus of sustained theological 
reflection. 
The Christian—and more specifically Protestant—legacy of the aca-
demic study of religion is evident in the way in which the prevailing 
paradigms of religious tradition tend to privilege certain categories while 
marginalizing others. These paradigms emphasize a series of hierarchical 
dichotomies in which categories that accord with the Protestant ethos are 
given priority. This hierarchizing of categories can be seen in a number 
of persistent trends in religious studies scholarship: first, the tendency to 
emphasize the distinction between sacred and profane and, as a corollary 
of the separation of church and state, to compartmentalize religion as 
something distinct from culture; second, the tendency to define religion 
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as a “belief system” and to give priority to categories such as faith, 
belief, doctrine, and theology while under-privileging the role of 
practice, ritual, and law; third, the tendency to give precedence to the 
individual over the community as the locus of religious life and conse-
quently to give less emphasis to the social and cultural dimensions of 
religion; and, fourth, the tendency to define religious identity in terms 
that privilege universalism over particularism and hence reflect a mission-
izing model of religious tradition. While recent developments in the 
fields of ritual studies and cultural studies have provided important 
correctives to such tendencies, the Protestant legacy still lingers—albeit 
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The Protestant subtext of the dominant paradigms provides the implicit 
standard against which other religious traditions are compared and evalu-
ated. While perhaps appropriate for the study of some religious traditions, 
such paradigms, together with the hierarchical taxonomies they perpetuate, 
become straitjackets when applied to other traditions. One of the tasks of 
the comparative study of religion in this context is to test and critique the 
prevailing paradigms, expose their inadequacies, and generate a range of 
possible models to account for the multiplicity of religious traditions. The 
comparative study of Hindu and Jewish traditions in particular serves to 
illustrate how two of the world’s major religious traditions defy the 
classificatory schemas associated with the prevailing Protestant-based 
paradigms. These traditions construct other categories and taxonomies 
that bring to light different sets of relationships, such as those between 
religion and culture, ethnic identity and religious adherence, observance 
and non-observance, and purity and impurity. Such relationships are 
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obscured by the application of the prevailing models. In contrast to the 
Protestant-based paradigms, in which precedence is given to belief, 
doctrine, and theology, and tradition-identity is rooted in the universaliz-
ing values of missionizing traditions, Hindu and Jewish traditions provide 
alternative models of religious tradition, in which priority is given to 
issues of practice, observance, and law, and tradition-identity is defined 
primarily in terms of particular ethnic and cultural categories that are tied 
to notions of blood descent. 
Among the array of Hinduisms and Judaisms, bråhma~ical Hinduism 
and rabbinic Judaism in particular share significant affinities. Indeed, my 
work suggests that—contrary to the stereotypical characterization of 
Hindu and Jewish traditions as representing opposite ends of the spectrum 
of the world’s religions—the bråhma~ical and rabbinic traditions consti-
tute two species of the same genus of religious tradition: as elite textual 
communities that have codified their respective norms in the form of 
scriptural canons; as ethno-cultural systems concerned with issues of 
family, ethnic and cultural integrity, blood lineages, and the intergenera-
tional transmission of traditions; and as religions of orthopraxy charac-
terized by hereditary priesthoods and sacrificial traditions, comprehen-
sive legal systems, complex dietary laws, and elaborate regulations 
concerning purity and impurity. I term the bråhma~ical and rabbinic 
traditions “embodied communities” in that their notions of tradition-
identity, in contrast to the universalizing tendencies of missionizing 
traditions, are embodied in the particularities of ethnic and cultural 
categories defined in relation to a particular people (Indo-Åryans, Jews), 
a particular sacred language (Sanskrit, Hebrew), and a particular land 
(Åryåvarta, Israel). These ethno-cultural systems share an abiding 
concern for the body as a site of central significance that is the vehicle 
for the maintenance of the social, cosmic, and divine orders. The body is 
the instrument of biological and socio-cultural reproduction that is to be 
regulated through ritual and social duties, maintained in purity, sustained 
through proper diet, and reproduced through appropriate sexual relations. 
In their roles as “peoples of the body”19 the bråhma~ical and rabbinic 
traditions provide the basis for constructing alternative models of religious 
tradition to the prevailing Protestant-based paradigms.20 
In order to ground this discussion of the “why” of comparative study 
in more practical considerations of “how” we might undertake the pro-
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posed type of comparative critical inquiry, I would like to reflect briefly 
on the work of the AAR Comparative Studies in Hinduisms and Judaisms 
Group (1998 to present), which I helped to establish along with its 
predecessor, the AAR Comparative Studies in Hinduisms and Judaisms 
Consultation (1995 to 1997). One of the express purposes of the Group, 
as well as of the Consultation on which it builds, has been to bring 
together specialists in South Asia and Judaica to engage in a series of 
sustained reflections on topics within Hinduisms and Judaisms, with the 
intention of challenging scholars of religion to critically reassess the 
dominant paradigms and to reconfigure our scholarly discourse to include 
a range of models and categories arising out of case studies of Hindu and 
Jewish traditions. The format for the sessions of the Comparative Studies 
in Hinduisms and Judaisms Group has generally included presentations 
by South Asian specialists and by Judaica specialists, followed by a 
response that serves to highlight the broader comparative implications of 
the presentations, especially with respect to their contributions to the re-
visioning of certain analytical categories in the study of religion. We 
have experimented with different formats, all of which are designed to 
foster collaborative research, including sessions with four complemen-
tary papers by specialists in the two traditions, sessions with two papers 
providing in-depth analyses of a particular theme, and sessions with a 
mix of comparative papers and joint presentations.  
The program of sessions sponsored by the Comparative Studies in 
Hinduisms and Judaisms Group and Consultation since 1995 has engaged 
a wide spectrum of traditions in a diverse array of configurations: biblical 
and Vedic traditions, bråhma~ical and rabbinic traditions, the esoteric 
traditions of Tantra and Kabbalah, bhakti and Óasidic movements, 
women’s ritual traditions, modern nationalist movements in India and 
Israel, contemporary Hindu and Jewish diaspora communities, and so on. 
The sessions have explored new ways of thinking about certain analytical 
categories in the study of religion that are critical to our scholarly inquiries, 
such as constructions of purity and impurity (1995), regimens of domestic 
asceticism (1996), discourses of the body (1998), constructions of the 
female principle (1999), hermeneutical strategies (1999), genealogies of 
sacrifice (2000), the dialectic of homeland and diaspora (2001), religious 
nationalisms (1997, 2002), and meditation traditions (2003).  
One example will have to suffice to illustrate the types of analytical 
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categories and issues addressed by the Comparative Studies in Hindu-
isms and Judaisms Group and its predecessor, the Consultation. The two 
sessions of the Comparative Studies in Hinduisms and Judaisms Group 
in 2000 focused on a critical interrogation of prevailing theories of 
sacrifice in the academy, with particular emphasis on the ways in which 
Vedic and Jewish sacrificial traditions challenge the models of sacrifice 
proposed by theorists such as Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, René 
Girard, and Walter Burkert.21 One of the contributions of this compara-
tive inquiry—particularly as represented in the work of scholars such as 
Kathryn McClymond (2002, 2008) who have undertaken sustained 
investigations of Vedic and Jewish sacrificial rituals—has been to call 
into question three assumptions that underlie the theories of Hubert and 
Mauss, Girard, Burkert, and others. The first assumption is that animal 
sacrifice is the paradigmatic form of sacrifice. The second assumption is 
that sacrifice involves the destruction of the offering—or the killing of 
the animal victim—and that the act of killing is the defining element of 
sacrifice. The third assumption, which follows from the first two, is that 
sacrifice can be equated with ritual violence. Ivan Strenski, in his review 
of studies of sacrifice in the 1990s, observes that “these days, the very 
concept of ritual violence seems to have been folded into that of sacrifice, 
making the two virtually identical.…This obsession with violence in 
studies of sacrifice shows little sign of diminishing” (1996: 11).  
The initial phase of our comparative inquiry involves interrogating 
these three assumptions and demonstrating that theories that characterize 
sacrifice as ritual violence, which are based on Western exempla in 
which bloody animal sacrifices are paradigmatic, are inadequate to 
account for the Vedic sacrificial tradition. First, animal sacrifices are not 
paradigmatic in the Vedic case. The Vedic yajña, or “sacrifice,” in its 
public form comprises the classical rauta rituals that are traditionally 
divided into three principal classes, which are distinguished primarily by 
the material substances that are used as offerings or oblations: the i‚†i, 
which centers on rice or barley offerings; the paubandha, which is 
characterized by animal offerings; and the Soma ritual, which centers on 
offerings of juice from the Soma plant. It is the Soma ritual—not the 
paubandha, or animal sacrifice—that is given precedence in the Vedic 
tradition as the paradigmatic sacrifice that is the apex of the sacrificial 
hierarchy. Second, the destruction of the offering is not the defining 
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characteristic of rauta sacrifice but rather must be understood as only 
one among a number of interdependent activities that together constitute 
the syntax of Vedic ritual. Third, the destruction of the offering is framed 
in classical Vedic ritual texts as part of a carefully ordered ritual system 
that relegates the messy actualities of violence and blood to the world 
beyond the ritual enclosure.22 In the case of the paubandha, the destruc-
tion of the animal is characterized as “quietening” (root am) and not as 
“killing” (root han), and the actual immolation is marginalized and 
domesticated in that it is performed outside the ritual enclosure and the 
animal is suffocated or strangled rather than decapitated, thus avoiding 
the inauspicious act of bloodletting. In the case of the Soma ritual, the 
paradigmatic Vedic sacrifice, the act of destruction involves the crushing 
and pressing of the Soma plant in order to extract the Soma juice that 
will be used as an oblation.  
The first phase of our comparative inquiry thus leads to the conclusion 
that theories that imagine sacrifice as ritual violence involving the bloody 
slaying of a victim are not adequate to account for the multilayered sig-
nifications of Vedic rauta sacrifices. In the second phase of our inquiry 
we turn to the Jewish sacrificial tradition and attempt to reimagine sacrifice 
and open up hitherto unexplored dimensions by juxtaposing Jewish con-
structions of sacrifice with Vedic constructions. In the Jewish sacrificial 
tradition, in contrast to the Vedic tradition, animals are the preferred 
offering substance in four of the five classes of offerings delineated in 
biblical and rabbinic texts: the ‘ôlåh (“burnt offering”), the ªa††å’t (“sin 
offering” or “purification offering”), the elåmîm (“peace offering” or 
“well-being offering”), and the ’ååm (“guilt offering” or “transgression 
offering”). The fifth class of offerings comprises grain offerings, or minªåh.  
As McClymond’s work has emphasized, the investigation of Jewish 
sacrifice within a broader comparative framework that includes Vedic 
sacrifice brings to light a number of elements in the Jewish case that 
have previously received insufficient attention. First, vegetal offerings 
play a significant role in the Jewish sacrificial tradition, not only as a 
distinct class of offerings but also as an important component of animal 
sacrifices. Second, in the various classes of animal sacrifice, it is not the 
killing of the animal that is the defining element of the sacrifice, but it is 
rather the procedures for manipulating the blood and the methods of 
dividing and distributing the portions of the animal that distinguish one 
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class of animal sacrifice from the other. As in the Vedic case, the destruc-
tion of the offering should be viewed not as the sine qua non of the 
sacrifice but rather as one among a number of interrelated activities that 
together constitute the sacrificial matrix. Third, the central importance of 
blood in the Jewish sacrificial tradition provides a counterpoint to the 
Vedic sacrificial tradition’s abhorrence of blood. At the same time, if we 
shift our attention from the blood as a counterpart of the violent death of 
the animal to the blood as the “life-essence” of the animal, we open up 
fruitful avenues of comparative inquiry that point to the role of sacrifice 
in providing access to various types of life-essence: the blood that is 
extracted from the animal in Jewish animal sacrifices, the breath that is 
extracted from the animal in the Vedic paubandha, and the juice that is 
extracted from the Soma plant in Vedic Soma rituals (see McClymond 
2002, 2008). 
 
This brief comparative venture into Vedic and Jewish constructions of 
sacrifice brings us back to a consideration of one of the important tasks 
of comparative study, which is to challenge scholars to critically interro-
gate the theories, models, and categories that serve to perpetuate the 
legacy of hegemonic paradigms in the academy—whether Eurocentric 
paradigms, Protestant Christian paradigms, or other dominant paradigms 
—and to reconstitute our scholarly discourse to allow for a multiplicity 
of epistemologies. Comparative analysis is not only intrinsic to the process 
through which categories and models are constructed and applied, but it 
also can serve as an important corrective to the discursive practices 
through which certain categories and models have been privileged over 
others in the human sciences. Comparative analysis can serve not only   
as a heuristic tool to establish taxonomies but also as a critical method   
to interrogate and dismantle their tyrannies. Understood in this way, 
comparative study is accorded its rightful place as a viable post-modern 
and post-postmodern approach that helps us to move beyond hegemony 




This article expands on my earlier reflections in Katz, Chakravarti, 
Sinha, and Weil 2007. 
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1. In his use of the expression “Europeanization of the earth,” Halbfass 
invokes both Husserl’s discussion of the “Europeanization of all foreign 
parts of mankind” and Heidegger’s reflections on the “complete Europe-
anization of the earth and of mankind” (see 1988: 167–70, 437, 439–42). 
2. These two functions correspond, respectively, to the “heuristic” and 
“provocative” functions of comparison described by the comparative 
philosopher of religion Thomas Kasulis: “Comparison typically serves 
one of two purposes. It can, first of all, try to increase our understanding 
of one or both of the comparates by seeing one in light of the other. This 
is a heuristic function, a way of classifying and gathering information. 
Secondly, comparison may try to use the similarities and differences as a 
means of provoking a new perspective on a traditional issue.…This is a 
provocative function, one that leads immediately to questions, not 
answers” (1993: xiii). 
3. This expression derives from Lincoln (1985).  
4. This expression derives from Pollock (1993: 114–15). 
5. Among representative works, see Abu-Lughod (1989); Blaut (1993, 
2000); Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997); Chaudhuri (1990); Frank (1998); 
Frank and Gills (1993); Goody (1996); Hodgson (1993); Lewis and 
Wigen (1997); Perlin (1993, 1994); Pomeranz (2000); Sanderson (1995). 
The work of a number of these scholars will be discussed in the follow-
ing analysis. 
6. See in particular Blaut 1993, 2000. 
7. For an articulation of this theory, see Jones 1981. Jones modified his 
position concerning European exceptionalism in his later 1988 work. 
8. See also 30–41 for Blaut’s discussion of the “ethnography of belief” 
and more specifically the Eurocentric belief system of the academic elite 
that served to foster the interests of European colonialism and neo-
colonialism.  
9. This table is an adaptation and expansion of Blaut’s table (17). 
10. This expression derives from McNeill’s (1963) classic study of 
world history. 
11. See in particular Eaton’s (1995) critique of Blaut’s work (1993). 
See also Frank’s (1998) critical reassessment of the work of Blaut and 
other world-system theorists, which will be discussed later. 
12. For Abu-Lughod’s overview of these eight subsystems, see 33–37. 
13. In his co-edited volume with Gills (1993), Frank disputes Waller-
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stein’s theory that the modern world-system that emerged in 1450 was 
the first and only world-system and argues instead that Wallerstein’s 
five-hundred-year system is a continuation of the same world-system that 
has existed for at least five thousand years. 
14. Cited in Delgado and Romero (2000: 11). 
15. Goodman’s introduction provides a brief survey of previous studies 
that have attempted to delineate connections between Hindu and Jewish 
traditions.  
16. See also the special issue of Shofar on Judaism and Asian Religions 
edited by Kasimow (1999). 
17. This analysis of AAR Program Units is based on data compiled from 
the AAR website, http://www.aarweb.org/Meetings/Annual_Meeting/ 
Program_Units/default.asp, in April 2010.  
18. A number of scholars have raised issues concerning the persistence 
of Protestant presuppositions and categories in the academic study of 
religion (see, for example, Neusner 1986: 13–17; Schopen 1991). See 
also Staal’s (1989: 387–419) more general critique of Western paradigms 
of religious tradition, which he argues are inappropriate for the study of 
Asian traditions. 
19. Eilberg-Schwartz uses this designation for the Jews in his edited 
collection People of the Body: Jews and Judaism from an Embodied 
Perspective (1992). See also Boyarin 1993. For a brief analysis of Hindu 
discourses of the body, see Holdrege 1998. For an extended study, see 
Holdrege forthcoming. 
20. Elsewhere I have suggested that one way of rethinking the notion 
of religious tradition is to posit a spectrum in which religious traditions 
are mapped according to different degrees of ethno-cultural specificity, 
with embodied communities such as bråhma~ical Hinduism and rabbinic 
Judaism on one end of the spectrum and missionizing traditions such as 
Christian and Buddhist traditions on the other end. A range of interme-
diary cases could be mapped in between, such as the Islamic tradition, 
which constitutes a missionizing-yet-partially-embodied community (see 
Holdrege 1999, 1996). Morris (1992) has emphasized the heuristic value 
of positing two discrete models—missionary traditions (Christianities, 
Islams, Buddhisms) and non-missionary traditions (Hinduisms, Juda-
isms)—in order to elucidate the notion of religious tradition.  
21. I am co-editing, along with Kathryn McClymond, a volume entitled 
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Beyond Hubert and Mauss: Reimagining Sacrifice in Hindu and Jewish 
Traditions, which presents the collective fruits of the two sessions along 
with a number of additional essays. 
22. Heesterman (1993), in his theory of Vedic ritual, posits a “pre-
classical” Indo-Åryan sacrifice that preceded the establishment of the 
“classical” Vedic çrauta ritual described in the Bråhma~as and Çrauta 
S¨tras. He is particularly concerned to elucidate the mechanisms through 
which the “agonistic” pre-classical sacrifice, which was characterized by 
conflict, violence, and uncertainty, was transformed into the carefully 
regulated world of Vedic ritualism, which sought to establish an absolute 
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